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PARTIES
The parties are fully identified in the caption of the case.

JURISDICTION
This Court is authorized by Section 78-2-2(3)(i), Utah Code
Annotated (1953 as amended), to hear this appeal from the District Court
because the Utah Court of Appeals does not have original jurisdiction under
Section 78-2a-3, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended).

RELATED OR PRIOR APPEALS
There have been no prior appeals in this action; however, this
Court is considering the constitutionality of Section 78-12-25.5, Utah Code
Annotated (1953 as amended), on certification from the United States District
Court for the District of Utah in Horton, et al, v. Goldminefs Daughter, et
al., and consolidated actions, in case number 870031.

NATURE OF PROCEEDING
This is an appeal from an Order of the District Court dismissing
with prejudice the Crossclaim of Defendant Skankey against co-Defendants
Thomas, Peterson and Hammond, d/b/a Thomas Peterson Hammond &
Associates. The Order of Dismissal from which this appeal is taken contains,
by its terms, a Rule 54 certification of finality.

ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

As applied by the District court in this case to Appellant's

Crossclaim for indemnity, is Section 78-12-25.5, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as
amended), unconstitutional in that it precludes free access to the court in
contravention of Article I, Section 11, of the Utah Constitution?
2.

In view of the provisions of Section 78-27-41, Utah Code

Annotated (1953 as amended 1986), did the trial court err in dismissing
Appellant's Crossclaim?

2

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY

Article I. Section 11. Constitution of Utah:
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an
injury done to him in his person, property or reputation,
shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be
administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no
person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending
before any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel,
any civil cause to which he is a party.
Section 78-27-41. Utah Code Annotated (1953 as
amended 1986):
A person seeking recovery, or any defendant who is
a party to the litigation, may join as parties any
defendants who may have caused or contributed to the
injury or damage for which recovery is sought, for the
purpose of having determined their respective proportions
of fault.
Section 78-12-25.5. Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended):1
No action to recover damages for any injury to
property, real or personal, or for any injury to the
person, or for bodily injury or wrongful death, arising
out of the defective and unsafe condition of an
improvement to real property, nor any action for
damages sustained on account of such injury, shall be
brought against any person performing or furnishing the
design, planning, supervision of construction or
construction of such improvement to real property more
than seven years after the completion of such
construction.
(1) "Person" shall mean an individual,
corporation, partnership, or any other legal
entity.
(2) Completion of construction for the
purposes of this act shall mean the date of
issuance of a certificate of substantial
completion by the owner, architect, engineer or
lr

This section was amended in 1988 with regard to matters not material
to this appeal.
3

other agents, or the date of the owner's use or
possession of the improvement on real property.
The limitation imposed by this provision shall
not apply to any person in actual possession and control
as owner, tenant or otherwise, of the improvement at the
time the defective and unsafe condition of such
improvement constitutes the proximate cause of the
injury for which it is proposed to bring an action.
This provision shall not be construed as
extending or limiting the periods otherwise prescribed by
the laws of this state for the bringing of any action.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Respondents Thomas, Peterson and Hammond first moved the lower
court

to

dismiss

Plaintiffs

Amended

Complaint

on

the

basis

of

Section 78-12-25.5, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended). (R. at 58.) The
Court granted that motion. (R. at 110.) Plaintiff has taken no appeal from
the dismissal of her action against Respondents, which was certified as "final"
pursuant to Rule 54 (R. at 193, reproduced infra at A-22 through A-24).
Thereafter, Respondents filed a similar motion, seeking the dismissal of
Appellant's Crossclaim for indemnity.

(R. at 139.) That motion was also

granted (R. at 189) and certified as final (R. at 190, reproduced infra at A-19
through A-21) by the District Court. Appellant appeals from that dismissal.
(R. at 196.)

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Since the decision under review was pursuant to a Motion to
Dismiss, the factual allegations of Appellant's Crossclaim are deemed true.
From those allegations, together with matters as to which the parties have
4

agreed in various Memoranda filed with the lower court, the following facts
emerge.
The Plaintiff, an elderly woman, alleges that she was injured on
December 29, 1986, in the parking lot of the Olympus Hills Mall in Salt Lake
County, Utah, when she "tripped and fell several feet over a retaining wall."
(Complaint, R. at 2, at paragraph 5, reproduced infra at A-2 through A-6.)
Approximately five weeks later, on February 7, 1987, Plaintiff filed suit
against Defendant (now Appellant) Richard Skankey, alleging that the
"retaining wall" was dangerous. (Complaint, R. at 2.) In November of 1987,
Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint, naming as additional parties defendant
Respondents Thomas, Peterson, and Hammond. (Amended Complaint, R. at 30.)
Respondents Thomas, Peterson, and Hammond were the architects
and engineers responsible for the planning and design of the construction of
the Olympus Hills Mall parking lot at the location at which Plaintiff alleges
she was injured.

(Crossclaim, R. at 88, at paragraph 1.)

Respondents

contracted with Appellant to plan and design the parking lot in a safe manner
and owed a duty to Appellant as well as the public generally to plan and
design the parking lot in a safe manner. (Crossclaim, R. at 88, at paragraphs
3 and 4.)

In her Amended Complaint, Plaintiff similarly alleges that her

injuries were due to the dangerous condition caused by the negligent failure
of Respondents Thomas, Peterson, and Hammond to design and plan the
parking lot properly. (Amended Complaint, R. at 30, at paragraph 15.)
The construction of the parking lot in question was substantially
completed in November of 1978.

5

Appellant filed an Answer to Plaintiffs Amended Complaint, and
crossclaimed against Respondents Thomas, Peterson, and Hammond, alleging
that if the "retaining wall" was dangerous as Plaintiff alleges, then it was as
a result of the design created by Respondents Thomas, Peterson, and
Hammond.

(Answer and Crossclaim, R. at 85, reproduced infra at A-13.)

Appellant sought both indemnification and a determination pursuant to
Section 78-27-41, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended 1986), of the
proportionate share of fault attributable to Respondents Thomas, Peterson,
and Hammond.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1. By analogy to the reasoning of this Court's ruling in Berry v.
Beech Aircraft, infra, the statute of repose contained in Section 78-12-25.5,
Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended), is unconstitutional because it
violates the "open courts" provisions of Article I, Section 11, of the
Constitution of Utah. Moreover, as demonstrated by the facts of this case,
application of the statute of repose is unfair because a landowner (such as
Appellant) who contracts with an architect to design a safe premises, may
incur liability to an injured person (such as the Plaintiff) but be precluded
from recovery over against the negligent architect.
2. The dismissal of Appellant's Crossclaim against the allegedly
negligent architects was also in contravention of Section 78-27-41, Utah Code
Annotated (1953 as amended 1986). That section is a key part of the Tort
Reform Act of 1986 and is necessary to effectuate the clearly manifest

6

purpose of rendering each defendant liable only for those injuries attributable
to his, her, or its own fault.

ARGUMENT

POINT I.

THE ARCHITECTS' STATUTE OF REPOSE VIOLATES

ARTICLE I, SECTION 11, OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH.
The parking lot now alleged to be dangerous was substantially
completed in November of 1978.

Accordingly, the seven-year statute of

repose contained in Section 78-12-25.5, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as
amended), cut off any right of action by Appellant as of November, 1985.
The Plaintiff does not allege, however, that she was injured until December
29, 1986. Accordingly, Appellant's cause of action for indemnification against
the respondent architects for their breach of their agreement and duty to
design the parking lot in a safe manner was barred by the statute of repose
before it ever arose. Accordingly, Appellant had no opportunity to pursue his
cause of action for indemnification.
In 1985, this Court addressed, in Berry v. Beech Aircraft,
111 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985), the constitutionality of the very similar statute of
repose contained in the Utah Product Liability Act. That statute of repose,
like the statute of repose at issue in this action, had operated to bar a cause
of action before that cause of action had even arisen. This Court held that
the statute of repose was unconstitutional because it violated Article I,
Section 11, of the Constitution of Utah. In so holding, this Court reasoned:

7

The clear language of the section guarantees access to
the courts and a judicial procedure that is based on
fairness and equality . . . .
A plain reading of
Section 11 also establishes that the framers of the
constitution intended that an individual could not be
arbitrarily deprived of effective remedies designed to
protect basic individual rights.
A constitutional
guarantee of access to the courthouse was not intended
by the founders to be an empty gesture; individuals are
also entitled to a remedy by "due course of law" for
injuries to "person, property, or reputation."
717 P.2d 675. This Court then went on to articulate and apply a two-prong
test to determine whether the statute of repose was constitutional: Was an
alternative remedy available and, if not, was abrogation of the cause of
action by the statute of repose justified by "a clear social or economic evil"?
(717 P.2d at 680).
In the present case, as in Berry v. Beech Aircraft, there was no
meaningful alternative remedy available and, in the present case, just as in
Berry v. Beech Aircraft, there is no "clear social or economic evil" requiring
the statute of repose.

While architectural standards may have changed

somewhat since 1978, the Plaintiff, the defendant landowner, and the architect
all face the same problem of proof. While those problems may be somewhat
greater for the Plaintiff, who has the burden of proof, they are equal as
between the defendant landowner and the architect. The cutting off of the
landowner's right of indemnification against the allegedly negligent architect
furthers no compelling social policy and eliminates no social or economic
"evil"; it merely places the defendant landowner in an untenable and
inequitable legal quagmire. Significantly, the Utah Legislature did not even
attempt to articulate a perceived public necessity for the abolition of causes

8

of action against architects for injuries occurring more than seven years after
the completion of their projects.
The precepts and logic set forth by this Court in its recent
decision in Berry v. Beech Aircraft, supra, compel the same result with
respect to the virtually identical statute of repose at issue in this action.
The seven-year architects' statute of repose is unconstitutional under Article
I, Section 11, of the Constitution of Utah. The lower court's dismissal of the
Crossclaim for indemnification was, accordingly, erroneous.

POINT

IL

EVEN

IF

THE

STATUTE

OF

REPOSE

IS

CONSTITUTIONAL, THE DISMISSAL OF THE CROSSCLAIM FOR
INDEMNIFICATION

WAS

PRECLUDED

IN

THIS

CASE

BY

SECTION 78-27-41.
The fundamental premise of the Tort Reform Act of 1986 is that
each defendant is liable only for that proportion of damages attributable to
the fault of that defendant.2

The concept of comparative negligence has

been retained in that a plaintiff may recover only from a defendant whose

2

Section 78-27-40, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended 1986),
provides:
[T]he maximum amount for which a defendant
may be liable to any person seeking recovery is that
percentage or proportion of the damages equivalent to
the percentage or proportion of fault attributed to that
defendant....
9

percentage of fault exceeds that of the plaintiff3, but the damage award is no
longer calculated by reducing the total damages by the plaintiffs percentage
of fault.
Since a plaintiffs judgment against a defendant is now calculated
as being that defendant's percentage of fault multiplied by the plaintiffs total
damages, it is necessary that all of the fault from all possible sources be
compared in one calculation at one time. The Legislature in drafting the Tort
Reform Act of 1986 recognized that all fault contributing to an injury would
have to be concurrently analyzed by the jury. Section 78-27-41, Utah Code
Annotated (1953 as amended 1986), enables analysis of all fault contributing
to a given injury by providing that:
A person seeking recovery, or any defendant
who is a party to the litigation, may join as parties any
defendants who may have caused or contributed to the
injury or damage for which recovery is sought, for the
purpose of having determined their respective proportions
of fault.
The facts of the present claim illustrate the necessity of comparing
all fault at one time as permitted by Section 78-27-41. Assuming arguendo
that the "retaining wall" over which the Plaintiff tripped constitutes a
dangerous condition, fault may lie with the architect (who designed it), the
3

Section 78-27-38, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended 1986),
provides:
The fault of a person seeking recovery shall not alone
bar recovery by that person. He may recover from any
defendant or group of defendants whose fault exceeds his
own. However, no defendant is liable to any person
seeking recovery for any amount in excess of the
proportion of fault attributable to that defendant.
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landowner (who might have made changes in warnings, railings, or lighting
conditions) or the injured person (who might have failed to exercise due care
for her own well being)4. Hypothetically, the finder of fact could determine
that the architect was 80% responsible, the landowner 15% responsible, and
the plaintiff 5% responsible.

Assuming that the Plaintiffs injuries were

determined to be $10,000.00, the Plaintiff would recover $8,000.00 from the
architect and $1,500.00 from the landowner.
However, the lower court has dismissed the architect from the
lawsuit. Thus, the jury can compare only the fault of the plaintiff and the
landowner. Unfortunately, when the jury compares merely the fault of the
plaintiff and the landowner, but otherwise reaches the same conclusions, the
jury will allocate 75% of the fault to the landowner and 25% to the Plaintiff.
The Plaintiff would then recover $7,500.00 from the landowner. Clearly, this
is not the result intended by the Legislature since it results in a recovery by
the injured person from the landowner of an amount far in excess of the
landowner's actual proportionate share of the damages sustained.

The

unintended and anomalous result is the result of the trial court's dismissal of
the

respondent

architects

in

direct

violation

of

the

mandate

of

Section 78-27-41.
It is important to note that the key provision, Section 78-27-41, is
not phrased in terms of the original parties having the right to litigate the
fault of non-parties, but clearly in terms of the original parties "joining" (/.&,
bringing in) additional persons as defendants. This is because of the obvious
4

There is no allegation, in the present case, that the parking lot was
not constructed in accordance with the architect's specifications.
11

impracticality of the original parties attempting to litigate vicariously the
position of non-parties.5
By dismissing the respondent architects in violation of the mandate
of Section 78-27-41, the trial court has wholly frustrated the fundamental
precept of the Tort Reform Act of 1986 - that each party should be
responsible only for his, her, or its own fault.

CONCLUSION
The architects' statute of repose, when applied to the facts of this
case, serves to preclude Appellant's cause of action for indemnification before
that claim ever arose.

Accordingly, particularly in light of this Court's

decision with respect to the analogous statute of repose found in the Utah
Product Liability Act, the architects' statute of repose is unconstitutional.
The lower court erred in dismissing Appellant's Crossclaim for indemnification.
The fundamental precept of the Tort Reform Act of 1986 is that
each defendant should be responsible only for that defendant's own fault.
Accordingly, it is necessary that all of the fault causing a given injury be
simultaneously analyzed by the jury.

In order to allow the necessary

concurrent analysis of all of the fault leading to an injury, the Legislature
provided that any party might join as additional defendants any other person
5

For example, if only the injured person and the landowner were to
attempt to litigate the fault attributable to the architect, the injured person
would be placed in the wholly anomalous position of having to argue that the
architect was without fault (/.&, that the condition about which she complains
was not, in fact, dangerous) and the landowner would have to argue that the
condition was, in fact, dangerous but was attributable to the architect. Both
positions are irreconcilably inconsistent with the natural positions of the
Plaintiff and the landowner in the litigation.
12

"who may have caused or contributed to the injury."

The dismissal of

Appellant's Crossclaim against the architects was directly contrary to Section
78-27-41 and is erroneous.
The Order of Dismissal entered by the lower court dismissing
Appellant's claims against the respondent architects must be reversed and the
Crossclaim reinstated.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this W _ day of September, 1988.
PARKEN & fKECK

jinsel fo\ Defendant and
pliant Richard Skankey d/b/a
pus Hills Mall

Original signature

13

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the

\0^

day of September, 1988, I

caused four (4) true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to
be mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:
Mark S. Gustavson
Counsel for Defendants/Respondents
Gustavson, Schultz, Hall & Williams
630 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah
Fred R. Silvester
Counsel for Plaintiff
Suitter, Axland, Armstrong & Hanson
175 South West Temple Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Original Signature

14

Addendum
Pa
Complaint and Jury Demand

A

Amended Complaint and Jury Demand

A

Answer and Crossclaim

A

Final Order of Dismissal as to Plaintiffs claims against architects

A

Final Order of Dismissal of Crossclaim against architects

A

A-l

. . . .

HIED !N CtrRIC'S OFFICE
SALT LAKt COUNTY. UTAH

FILMED

"0,°

b

FEB

17 4 3s PH #B7

BY/
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SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON
Attorney for Plaintiff
Karen Stilling
700 Clark Learning Office Center
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY

7/^

STATE OF UTAH
KAREN STILLING,
COMPLAINT AND JURY DEMAND

Plaintiff,
vs.
RICHARD L. SKANKEY, d/b/a
Olympus Hills Mall,

civil N o . ^ p y - / / ^

Defendant.

Plaintiff for a cause of action against defendant claims
and alleges as follows:
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
1.

Plaintiff Karen Stilling is a resident of Twin

Falls, Idaho.
2.

Defendant Richard L. Skankey is a resident of Salt

Lake County, State of Utah and is registered with the Utah
Corporations Division as doing business as Olympus Hills Mall.

A-2

3.

The acts or omissions upon which this action is

based occurred in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
4.

On the night of December 29, 1986, the plaintiff

was a business invitee at Olympus Hills Mall.
5.

On December 29, 1986, plaintiff, while walking in

the northern-most parking lot of Olympus Hills Mall, north of the
Castletons store, tripped and fell several feet over a retaining
wall.
6.

As a result of the fall on December 29, 1986,

plaintiff suffered and continues to suffer severe personal injuries, including numerous fractures of her left leg, physical
and emotional distress.
7.

As a result of the severe personal injuries, plain-

tiff has been required to undergo extensive medical and hospital
treatment, which treatment is ongoing and continuing.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
Plaintiff reincorporates her allegations contained in
paragraphs 1 through 7 above.
8.

The following acts of negligence by the defendant

directly and proximately caused plaintiff's damages as herein alleged:
(a)

Failure to warn business invitees of a known

danger on the land;

- 2 -

a_o

(b)

Failure to provide railings, barriers or other

guarding to prevent injury to business invitees;
(c)

Failure to adequately mark, illuminate, or

otherwise call to the attention of business invitees in the
parking lot of Olympus Hills Mall the dangerous condition
of the retaining wall between the parking lot and the roadway
below; and
(d)

Failure to provide adequate lighting in the

parking lot to illuminate the dangerous condition of the retaining wall after dark.
9.

Defendant owed a duty to use reasonable care to

protect business invitees, such as the plaintiff, from harm resulting from defective and dangerous conditions on the land and
the above acts of negligence were a breach of that duty of reasonable care.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
Plaintiff reincorporates her allegations contained in
paragraphs 1 through 9 above.
10.

Defendant, as owner of Olympus Hills Mall, knew

of the dangerous conditions presented by the retaining wall north
of the Castleton's store.
11.

Defendant knew that the retaining wall presented

a high likelihood of serious bodily injury to business invitees.

- 3 -

12.

Defendant was given actual notice by business

owners and employees in Olympus Hills Mall that the retaining
wall in question presented a danger to business invitees without
proper railing or barriers.
13.

Defendant's action in failing to provide sufficient

guarding or barriers, railings or warnings of the retaining wall
when defendant was on actual notice of the dangerous condition
constitutes wilfull, malicious and/or reckless conduct and disregard for the law and the rights of the plaintiff.
14.

Plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages as a

result of defendant's willful and malicious or reckless behavior.
NOW, WHEREFORE, plaintiff requests a jury trial and
prays for judgment in her favor and against defendant as follows:
1.

For special damages for the costs of hospital

and medical care and treatment;
2.

For general damages for pain and suffering, both

physical and emotional;
3.

For damage for loss of bodily function;

4.

For prejudgment interest as allowed by law;

5.

For punitive damages in an amount determined by

the trier of fact; and
6.

For such other and further relief as the Court

deems just.

A-5

DATED this
/

7 day of F
^

-lary, 1987.

/

^

^

FR3D/£. SILVESTER/," Esq.
CHARLES P. SAMPSON, Esq.
of and for
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON
Attorneys for Karen Stilling
Plaintiff's Address:
113 9 Fifth Avenue, East
Twin Falls, Idaho 83301
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Fit EO III CLERKS OFflCS
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Nov IS 4 2sPH'y:
FRED R. SILVESTER, Esq. (#3862)
CHARLES P. SAMPSON, Esq. (#4658)
of and for
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON
Attorney for Plaintiff
Karen Stilling
700 Clark Learning Office Center
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480
Telephone: (801) 532-7300
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
KAREN STILLING,
AMENDED COMPLAINT
AND JURY DEMAND

Plaintiff,
vs.
RICHARD L. SKANKEY, d/b/a
Olympus Hills Mall; TIMOTHY F.
THOMAS, WILLIAM F. THOMAS,
STEPHEN G. PETERSEN AND JOHN
M. HAMMOND, d/b/a THOMAS,
PETERSEN, HAMMOND & ASSOC.

Civil No. C 87-1156
Judge Richard H. Moffat

Defendants.
Plaintiff for a cause of action against defendant claims
and alleges as follows:
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
1.

Plaintiff Karen Stilling is a resident of Twin

Falls, Idaho.
2.

Defendant Richard L. Skankey is a resident of Salt

Lake County, State of Utah and is registered with the Utah
Corporations Division as doing business as Olympus Hills Mall.

0<

3.

Timothy F. Thomas, William F. Thomas, Stephen G.

Petersen and John M. Hammond are registered as doing business as
Thomas Petersen Hammond & Associates ("Thomas Petersen"), which
has its principal place of business in Salt Lake County, State
of Utah.
4.

The acts or omissions upon which this action is

based occurred in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
5.

On the night of December 29, 1986, the plaintiff

was a business invitee at Olympus Hills Mall ("Mall").
6.

That night, while walking in the northern-most

parking lot of the Mall, north of the Castletons store, plaintiff
tripped over a curb and fell several feet to a driveway below.
7.

As a result of the fall, plaintiff has suffered

and continues to suffer personal injuries, including numerous
fractures of her right leg and physical and emotional distress.
8.

As a result of the personal injuries, plaintiff

has been required to undergo medical and hospital treatment,
which treatment is ongoing and continuing.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
9.

Plaintiff incorporates the allegations contained

in paragraphs 1 through 8 above as if fully set forth herein.
10.

The following acts of negligence by the defendant
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Richard Skankey actually and proximately caused plaintiff's
damages:
(a)

Failure to warn business invitees of a known

danger on the land;
(b)

Failure to provide railings, barriers or other

guarding to prevent injury to business invitees;
(c)

Failure to adequately mark, illuminate, or

otherwise call to the attention of business invitees in the
parking lot of Olympus Hills Mall the dangerous condition
of the curb between the parking lot and the driveway below;
and
(d)

Failure to provide adequate lighting in the

parking lot to illuminate the dangerous condition of the retaining wall after dark.
11.

Defendant Richard Skankey owed a duty to business

invitees, such as the plaintiff, to use reasonable care to prevent
harm resulting from defective and dangerous conditions on his
land and the above acts of negligence were a breach of that duty
of reasonable care.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays for damage as set forth
below.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
12.

Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1

through 11 above as if fully set forth herein.
- 3 -
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13.

Thomas Petersen designed and planned the addition/

remodel in which the parking lot northeast of the Castleton's
store was constructed.
14.

In designing and planning the addition/remodel

for the parking lot, Thomas Petersen failed to include adequate
barriers, railings or other protections to prevent falls such
as that suffered by the plaintiff.
15.

As a direct and proximate cause of Thomas

Petersen's breach of its duty to use reasonable care in designing
and planning the parking lot, plaintiff suffered severe personal
injuries and has been required to undergo medical and hospital
treatment, which treatment is ongoing and continuing.
NOW, WHEREFORE, plaintiff requests a jury trial and
prays for judgment in her favor and against defendants as follows:
1.

On plaintiff's First Cause of Action for judgment

against Richard Skankey dba Olympus Hills Mall for special damages for the costs of hospital, medical and nursing care and
treatment; lost past and future wages and other expenses necessarily incurred by the plaintiff as a result of her injuries;
and general damages for pain and suffering, both physical and
emotional; damages for loss of bodily function; and for such
other and further relief as the Court deem just and equitable
under the circumstances.
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2.

On plaintiff's Second Cause of Action for judgment

against Thomas Petersen for special damages for the costs of
hospital, medical and nursing care and treatment; lost past and
future wages and other expenses necessarily incurred by the plaintiff as a result of her injuries; and general damages for pain
and suffering, both physical and emotional; damages for loss of
bodily function; and for such other and further relief as the
Court deem just and equitable under the circumstances.

DATED t h i s

day of

SggvSeay&e?,

1987

-FiffiD R. SILVESTER, E s q .
CHARLES P . SAMPSON, E s q .

of and for
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON
Attorneys for Karen Stilling
Plaintiff's Address:
113 9 Fifth Avenue, East
Twin Falls, Idaho 83301
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a I caused a true and correct
copy of the above and foregoing Amended Complaint and Jury Demand
to be mailed, postage prepaid thereon, this
1987, to:
John D. Parken, Esq.
Marcella L. Keck
PARKEN & KECK
Attorneys for Defendant
Boston Building, Suite #808
#9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

CS14.19
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'_ day of

^ccti

John D. Parken (2518)
MarceUa L. Keck (4063)
PARKEN & KECK
Attorneys for Defendant
Richard L. Skankey, d/b/a
Olympus Hills Mall
Suite 808 Boston Building
#9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake Citv, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 596-2920
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KAREN STILLING,

ANSWER
TO
AMENDED
COMPLAINT and CROSS-CLAIM

Plaintiff,

Civil No. C87-1156
RICHARD L. SKANKEY, d/b/a
Olympus Hills Mall; TIMOTHY
F. THOMAS, WILLIAM F. THOMAS,
STEPHEN G. PETERSEN and JOHN
M. HAMMOND, d/b/a THOMAS,
PETERSEN, HAMMOND & ASSOC

The Honorable Richard H.
Moffat

Defendant.
-oooOooo-

Defendant Richard L. Skankey, by and through his counsel, John D.
Parken, hereby answers Plaintiffs Amended Complaint as follows:
FIRST DEFENSE
Responding to the specific allegations of Plaintiffs Amended
Complaint, this Defendant admits, denies, and alleges as follows:
1.

This Defendant lacks sufficient knowledge or information to

form a belief as to the truth of the allegations of paragraph 1 of Plaintiffs
Amended Complaint and, therefore, denies the same.

2.

This Defendant admits the allegations of paragraphs 2 and 3

of Plaintiffs Amended Complaint.
3.

In response to the allegations of paragraph 4 of Plaintiffs

Amended Complaint, this Defendant admits that Plaintiffs allegations are
alleged to have occurred in Salt Lake County.
4.

This Defendant admits the allegations of paragraph 5 of

Plaintiffs Amended Complaint.
5.

In response to the allegations of paragraph 6 of Plaintiffs

Amended Complaint, this Defendant admits that Plaintiff alleges that she
tripped, but denies that she fell several feet.
6.

Defendant denies the allegations of paragraphs 7 and 8 of

Plaintiffs Amended Complaint.
7.

In response to paragraph 9 of Plaintiffs Amended Complaint,

this Defendant incorporates by reference to Paragraphs 1 through 6 above.
8.

This Defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 10 of

Plaintiffs Amended Complaint in its entirety.
9.

In response to the allegations of paragraph 11 of Plaintiffs

Amended Complaint, this Defendant admits that he owed a duty to the public,
alleges that he fully and faithfully complied with that duty, and denies any
negligence or other breach of any duty.
10. In response to paragraph 12 of Plaintiffs Amended Complaint,
this Defendant incorporates by reference to paragraphs 1 through 9 above.
11. This Defendant admits the allegations of paragraph 13 of
Plaintiffs Amended Complaint.
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12. This Defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 14 of
Plaintiffs Amended Complaint. However, Defendant affirmatively alleges that
in the event the trier of fact finds any inadequacy in the parking lot as
alleged by Plaintiff, Defendants, Timothy F. Thomas, William F. Thomas,
Stephen G. Petersen and John M. Hammond, d/b/a Thomas, Petersen, Hammond
& Assoc, are responsible as alleged below.
13. This Defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 15 of
Plaintiffs Amended Complaint.
14. Except to the extent admitted or qualified in the foregoing
responses, this Defendant denies each and every material allegation of
Plaintiffs Amended Complaint.

SECOND DEFENSE
The damages and injuries of which Plaintiff complains, if any were
caused and contributed to by Plaintiffs own carelessness, inattention, and
fault, which was equal to or greater than that, if any of this Defendant.

THIRD DEFENSE
The damages and injuries of which Plaintiff complains, if any were
caused and contributed to by the negligence and fault of other persona and
entities over whom this Defendant neither exercised nor possessed control or
the right of control and any liability of this Defendant should be limited to
the pro rata share of the fault attributed to him.
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FOURTH DEFENSE
Plaintiff has failed to mitigate her damages and seeks an amount
greatly and grossly in excess of her actual damages, if any.
FIFTH DEFENSE
Plaintiff has received, or was entitled to receive, certain first-party
insurance benefits, the amount of which must be deducted from any recovery
that Plaintiff might otherwise be entitled to receive against this Defendant.
SIXTH DEFENSE
Plaintiffs action against this Defendant is barred and precluded by
the applicable statute of limitations and/or statue or repose, including,
without limitation, Section 78-12-25.5, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as
amended).
WHEREFORE, Defendant Richard L. Skankey respectfully demands
that Plaintiffs Amended Complaint be dismissed, no cause of action, and that
Plaintiff take nothing thereby but that this Defendant be awarded his costs of
court, counsel fees, and such other and further relief as this Court may deem
just and equitable under the circumstances and applicable law.

CROSS-CLAIM
Defendant, Richard L. Skankey cross-claims against Defendants
Timothy F. Thomas, William F. Thomas, Stephen G. Petersen and John M.
Hammond, d/b/a Thomas, Petersen, Hammond & Assoc, (hereinafter "Thomas
Petersen") alleging as follows:
1.

Defendants Thomas Petersen were the architects and engineers

responsible for the planning and design of the construction of the Olympus
4

Hills Mall parking lot at the location at which Plaintiff alleges she was
injured.
2.

Defendants Thomas Petersen contracted with this Defendant to

plan and design a safe premises.
3.

Defendants Thomas Petersen owe a duty to the public

generally to plan and design a safe premises.
4.

Plaintiff has brought this action for negligence against this

Defendant and against Defendants Thomas Petersen for the allegedly unsafe
parking lot.
5.

This Defendant denies both that he was negligent and that the

premises is unsafe but asserts that should it be determined that the premises
at issue are in any way inadequate, then the inadequacy results from the
negligence of Defendants Thomas Petersen and alleges that the fault lies with
Defendants Thomas Petersen.
6.

Should judgment be entered against this Defendant, this

Defendant is entitled to full and complete indemnification from Defendants
Thomas Petersen.
7.

Pursuant to Section 78-27-41, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as

amended) the fault of Defendants Thomas Petersen should be determined.
WHEREFORE, Defendant Richard L. Skankey respectfully demands
judgment of indemnification against Defendants Thomas Petersen with respect
to any liability adjudged against it in this action, together with any costs,
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expenses, counsel fees, or losses incurred by this Defendant and such other
and further relief as this Court may deem just and equitable.
DATED this ttA day of February, 1988.

yrney tor Defendant
rd L. Skankey
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the

/ c/~~~ day of February, 1988, I

caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing Answer to Amended
Complaint and Cross-Claim to be mailed, postage prepaid to the following:
Fred R. Silvester
Suitter, Axland, Armstrong & Hanson
175 South West Temple Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Mark Gustavson
630 East South Temple Suite 203
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
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APR 2LS 1988

Mark S. Gustavson, (1278)
Charles A. Schultz, (4760)
GUSTAVSON, HALL & WILLIAMS
Attorneys for Defendant
630 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone (801) 533-8361

H. Dixon H!ndl9y,£ierk
/, uerx3fd
.ydOist.
uist.Coun
Cou
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

)

ORDER OF DISMISSAL AND
FINAL JUDGMENT

1

Civil No. C87-1156

KAREN STILLING,
Plaintiff,
vs.
RICHARD L. SKANKEY, d/b/a
OLYMPUS HILLS MALL; TIMOTHY F.
THOMAS, WILLIAM F. THOMAS,
STEPHEN G. PETERSEN and JOHN
M. HAMMOND, d/b/a THOMAS,
PETERSEN, HAMMOND & ASSOCIATES,

i

(Judge:

Richard H. Moffat)

Defendants.
Defendants1 Timothy F. Thomas, William F. Thomas, Stephen G.
Petersen, and John Hammond, d/b/a Thomas, Petersen, Hammond and
Associates, Motion to Dismiss Co-Defendants1 Richard L. Skankey,
d/b/a Olympus Hills Mall Cross-claim, came on for regularly
scheduled hearing before the Honorable Judge Richard H. Moffat, on
April 8, 1988, at the hour of 9:00 a.m.

The Court, having

reviewed the file in this matter, having read and reviewed the
memoranda filed by the respective parties to this action, having
heard and considered the oral arguments of counsel, and now being
fully advised as to the relevant facts and the applicable law,

hereby grants Defendants1 Timothy F. Thomas, William F. Thomas,
Stephen G. Petersen, and John Hammond, d/b/a Thomas, Petersen,
Hammond and Associates, Motion to Dismiss Co-Defendants1 Richard
L. Skankey, d/b/a Olympus Hills Mall Cross-claim with prejudice.
Pursuant to Rule 54 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
this, and acting upon the request of parties to this action, this
Court herein certifies this Order of Dismissal to be Final
Judgment, finding there to be no reason for delay of an entry of a
Final Judgment upon the Motion of Defendants1 Timothy F. Thomas,
William F. Thomas, Stephen G. Petersen, and John Hammond, d/b/a
Thomas, Petersen, Hammond and Associates, to Dismiss the Crossclaim of Richard L. Skankey, d/b/a Olympus Hills Mall.
Dated this ^XS

day of April, 1988.
BY THE COURT:

ATTEST
H. DIXON HINDLEY
CLEPK

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I herebv certify that on the

IC/

day of April, 1988, I

served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Proposed Order of
Dismissal and Final Judgment to the persons at the addresses
listed below by depositing a copy in the United States Mail,
postage prepaid.
John D. Parken
Marcella L. Keck
Suite 808 Boston Building
No. 9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Fred R. Silvester
Charles P. Sampson
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON
700 Learning Clark Office Center
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480

Mark SZ—&&stavson
Charles A. Schultz
Attorney for Defendants
Timothy F. Thomas,
William F. Thomas,
Stephen G. Petersen, and
John Hammond, d/b/a
Thomas, Petersen, Hammond
and Associates
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Mark S. Gustavson, (1278)
Charles A. Schultz, (4760)
GUSTAVSON, HALL & WILLIAMS
Attorneys for Defendant
630 East South Temple
Salt Lake Cityf Utah 84102
Telephone (801) 533-8361

H. Dixon Knuiay,
3 ^ Dist. Co
Knujey, p
£ ^VrKK orp
Coun
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
KAREN STILLING,
1

AMENDED ORDER OF DISMISSAL
AND FINAL JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
1
RICHARD L. SKANKEY, d/b/a
OLYMPUS HILLS MALL; TIMOTHY F.
THOMAS, WILLIAM F. THOMAS,
STEPHEN G. PETERSEN and JOHN
M. HAMMOND, d/b/a THOMAS,
PETERSEN, HAMMOND & ASSOCIATES,

I

Civil No.

(Judge:

C87-1156

Richard H. Moffat)

Defendants.
Defendants1 Timothy F. Thomas, William F. Thomasf Stephen G.
Petersen, and John Hammond, d/b/a Thomasf Petersen, Hammond and
Associates, Motion to Dismiss the Complaint of Karen Stilling,
came on for regularly scheduled hearing before the Honorable Judge
Richard H. Moffat, on February 19, 1988, at the hour of 9:00 a.m.
All parties were represented at the hearing by their respective
counsel of record.
The Court, having reviewed the file in this matter, having
read and reviewed the memoranda filed by the respective parties to
this action, having heard and considered the oral arguments of
counsel, and now being fully advised as to the relevant facts and
the applicable law, hereby grants Defendants' Timothy F. Thomas,
William F. Thomas, Stephen G. Petersen, and John Hammond, d/b/a

Thomas, Petersen, Hammond and Associates, Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff Karen Stilling1s Complaint, as against Defendants
Timothy F. Thomas, William F. Thomas, Stephen G. Petersen, and
John Hammond, d/b/a Thomas, Petersen, Hammond and Associates with
prejudice.
Pursuant to Rule 54 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and
acting upon the request of parties to this action, this Court
herein certifies this Order of Dismissal to be Final Judgment,
finding there to be no reason for delay of an entry of a Final
Judgment upon the Motion of Defendants1 Timothy F. Thomas, William
F. Thomas, Stephen G. Petersen, and John Hammond, d/b/a Thomas,
Petersen, Hammond and Associates, to Dismiss the Complaint of
Karen Stilling as to Defendants Timothy F. Thomas, William F.
Thomas, Stephen G. Petersen, and John Hammond, d/b/a Thomas,
Petersen, Hammond and Associates.
Dated this <=</

day of April, 1988,
BY THE COURT:

RIC
DISTRICT
ATTEST
H. DIXCM HINDLEY
CLERK

Sy

^^lah^cUL
*puty Clerk

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the

$6hday of April, 1988, I

served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Proposed Amended
Order of Dismissal and Final Judgment to the persons at the
addresses listed below by depositing a copy in the United States
Mail, postage prepaid.
John D. Parken
Marcella L. Keck
Suite 808 Boston Building
No. 9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Fred R. Silvester
Charles P. Sampson
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON
700 Clark Learning Office Center
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480

S. Gustavson
Charles A. Schultz
Attorney for Defendants
Timothy F. Thomas,
William F. Thomas,
Stephen G. Petersen, and
John Hammond, d/b/a
Thomas, Petersen, Hammond
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